Erik Moberg ã:
A Theory of Democratic Politics
13 - PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUTIONS WITH
PROPORTIONAL ELECTIONS: THE MAIN ACTORS AND THE LOBBYISTS
According to the discussion in part 10 the main actors
are the likely targets for lobbying. In this constitutional setting, it
is thus the political parties, which essentially means the party leaderships
at the summits of the party hierarchies, which will be approached by the
lobbyists. Since these targets are few and powerful the lobbying will become
a very concentrated, and possibly closed, activity. Furthermore, and since
this constitutional setting to such a large extent is tuned towards interest
politics, it should be a very fertile ground for lobbying activities. The
lobbying is thus also likely to very effective.
In part 10 I argued that the lobbyists are likely to demand
what they can reasonably get. Here, since that is possible, the lobbyists
are likely to ask for changes of status quo - they will not be confined
to merely blocking.
Our first conclusion thus is that the lobbying activities
are likely to be concentrated, possibly closed, and very effective.
One interesting possibility is that trade unions, which are
formed for negotiating with their counterparts about wages and other conditions
of labor, are likely to become important lobbyists as well. Since the unions
are likely to be able to influence the voting behavior of their members
to some extent, they may even, by playing a mediating role, enforce the
contract character of the relation between parties and voters.
From this - and following the argument in part 10 - it may
be concluded that the interest organizations are likely to be long lasting
and formed before the laws, which support their interests, are created.
This conclusion, it should be noted, is further supported
by the fact that politics in the constitutional setting at issue here is
likely to be strongly interest oriented. Thus not only the organizational
prerequisites for alliances between parties and interest organizations
are present, but also strong positive incentives for that kind of collaboration.
Another conclusion, which follows form the fact that the
prerequisites for organizational ties between parties and organizations
as stated in part 10 are fulfilled, is that such ties are quite possible
- and perhaps even likely.