A Theory of Democratic Politics, 19

Erik Moberg ã:
A Theory of Democratic Politics

19 - PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONS WITH PROPORTIONAL ELECTIONS: THE MAIN ACTORS' INTERACTIONS

Here, as in the other systems we are studying, the main actors will try to further their ambitions by forming, or by just supporting, various decisive or blocking sets. In the presidential systems - this one as well as the majoritarian variety - the president has a particularly important role in these interactions. This is due to the following three aspects of the presidential power.

The inclusion of the president is often required for making a set decisive. Sometimes that requirement is dropped, but if so the requirements for a decisive set composed only of legislators is usually sharper. Some kind of qualified majority of legislators may for example be required.
The president is usually equipped with special, legal procedural power for making proposals.
The president may command resources of various kinds which may be used for giving favors, or compensations, to legislators in order to make them support a presidential proposal.

In the presidential, proportional system discussed here there may, as I have already mentioned (part 7), be some party main actors. Even so, however, there will also in all likelihood be quite a number individual main actors. The total number of main actors will therefore be rather great, and the conditions for coordination (see part 8) are consequently not the best. The main actor interaction is therefore likely to be characterized by a lot of uncoordinated behavior. Furthermore, and from the legislators' point of view, coordination, to the extent that it is possible at all, will be considerably easier when it aims at creating blocking sets rather than decisive sets. In particular this is so if there are two houses in the legislature (see part 2.1).

Now, taking all of this into account, the following hypothetical conclusions can be drawn about the main actor interaction in proportional, presidential systems:

The reactions to the proposals presented, whether they come from the president or the legislature, will to a large extent be uncoordinated. This means that the voting pattern, at least to a considerable extent, will vary from decision to decision. It also means that occasional majorities which are considerable larger than minimal winning should cause no surprise. It furthermore means that the political process will be continuos, rather than of the batch type. It also means that an organized opposition is unlikely.

Proposals for new legislation require, in order to pass, the creation of decisive sets, and they will therefore, in fact, often come from the president. This is a consequence of the aspects 1 and 2 above. The president has an advantage in creating decisive sets.

But even if it is difficult for the legislators to initiate new legislation, they may be successful in the much easier task of creating blocking sets. This is particularly so in this proportional setting, where some party groups in the legislature may be quite consolidated. The purpose may be to bring about some wanted changes in the proposal blocked. The purpose may however also be obstructive - the proposal may be blocked even by legislators symphatizing with the proposal. If so the idea of the blocking legislators may be to blackmail the president - to force him to give favors to themselves, or to their constituencies, in exchange for an end to the blocking. What makes this kind of blackmail possible, and attractive, is, of course, the fact indicated in point 3 above that the president controls resources of various kinds. Thus, and since the legislature does not dispose of any resources of the kind mentioned, we will never see any blackmailing in the opposite direction - the president will not try to blackmail the legislature.