A Theory of Democratic Politics, 13

Erik Moberg ã:
A Theory of Democratic Politics

13 - PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUTIONS WITH PROPORTIONAL ELECTIONS: THE MAIN ACTORS AND THE LOBBYISTS

According to the discussion in part 10 the main actors are the likely targets for lobbying. In this constitutional setting, it is thus the political parties, which essentially means the party leaderships at the summits of the party hierarchies, which will be approached by the lobbyists. Since these targets are few and powerful the lobbying will become a very concentrated, and possibly closed, activity. Furthermore, and since this constitutional setting to such a large extent is tuned towards interest politics, it should be a very fertile ground for lobbying activities. The lobbying is thus also likely to very effective.

Our first conclusion thus is that the lobbying activities are likely to be concentrated, possibly closed, and very effective.

In part 10 I argued that the lobbyists are likely to demand what they can reasonably get. Here, since that is possible, the lobbyists are likely to ask for changes of status quo - they will not be confined to merely blocking.

From this - and following the argument in part 10 - it may be concluded that the interest organizations are likely to be long lasting and formed before the laws, which support their interests, are created.

One interesting possibility is that trade unions, which are formed for negotiating with their counterparts about wages and other conditions of labor, are likely to become important lobbyists as well. Since the unions are likely to be able to influence the voting behavior of their members to some extent, they may even, by playing a mediating role, enforce the contract character of the relation between parties and voters.

Another conclusion, which follows form the fact that the prerequisites for organizational ties between parties and organizations as stated in part 10 are fulfilled, is that such ties are quite possible - and perhaps even likely.

This conclusion, it should be noted, is further supported by the fact that politics in the constitutional setting at issue here is likely to be strongly interest oriented. Thus not only the organizational prerequisites for alliances between parties and interest organizations are present, but also strong positive incentives for that kind of collaboration.